THE BROTHERWISE DISPATCH, VOL.3, ISSUE#18, DEC/2023-FEB/2024
Often reduced to the role of a mere instigator caught up in the epic intellectual melee between Jean- Paul Sartre and Albert Camus,[1] is there more to the thought of Francis Jeanson than meets the eye? What are we to make of Jeanson’s thought from an existential liberationist perspective? Indeed, how does his oft ignored Preface to Frantz Fanon’s seminal work Black Skin, White Masks[2] grapple with the exceptional antagonism of Black liberation against western imperialist power as it relates to the way Jeanson himself eventually embarked on an emancipatory turn from intellectual engagement to embrigadement during the Revolutionary War of Algerian independence from France? And how did Jeanson’s unabashed choice of embrigadement influence the manner by which his work suffers from the disregard of the normative gaze[3] of Empire?
And yet, what exactly do we mean by embrigadement as a more militant means of political action or social activism? And how is embrigadement to be distinguished from intellectual engagement? Is there a constitutive difference between intellectual engagement and embrigadement? Does embrigadement begin where intellectual engagement ends, or is embrigadement just the logical culmination of intellectual engagement as a militant means of socio-historical resistance? With this in mind, let us begin our understanding of embrigadement as it conceptually originates in dialogue with French intellectual historian David L. Schalk, in particular through his works The Spectrum of Political Engagement and War and the Ivory Tower.[4] Schalk acknowledges right from the outset that the lines between the two concepts are often blurred, and that “Bringing embrigadement into the discussion may, however, create more problems than it resolves, since it confronts us with the thorny, probably unresolvable, question of standards. One must recognize that what is true engagement for a given individual may be embrigadement for another, and would be seen by a third as folly, or even criminality.”[5]
So let us be clear that, for our purposes, what sets embrigadement apart from intellectual engagement is the very question of militance against a horizon of civil disobedience. Or in a more specific existential liberationist formulation, in drawing distinctions between intellectual engagement and embrigadement, we ultimately find ourselves faced with the question of protest-as-ritual event or protest-as-resistance.[6]
As such, it would be wise here to reacquaint ourselves with these two terms. Indeed, on the one hand we have protest-as-resistance, meaning collective action that disturbs the sovereign legitimacy of the normative gaze by an ascendant humanity that confronts established power with an emancipatory gaze of Revolt. Protest-as-resistance also speaks to a social praxis of collective unity as movement towards questioning and disrupting the boundaries of civil society in the name of Justice. And for the sake of argument, let us regard Martin Luther King Jr.’s involvement in the Civil Rights March in Birmingham, Alabama (April, 1963) as a clear example of protest-as-resistance.
On the other hand, protest-as-ritual event involves the reduction of protest to liberal-democratic passion plays that function more as catharsis for the imperial mainstream than as effective movement of resistance to established power. Protest-as-ritual event is also characterized by an unwillingness to question the boundaries of civil society in the name of law and order. Again, as a contrasting example drawing from the lived experience of the same revered historical figure, let us consider Martin Luther King Jr.’s involvement in the Civil Rights March on Washington, D.C. (August, 1963) as a telling example of protest-as-ritual event.
So how might these two historical examples of both protest-as-resistance and protest-as-ritual event speak to the question of intellectual engagement and embrigadement? Well, intellectuals who recognized the emancipatory implications of the March in Birmingham and critically sustained, supported and framed it as such through their work might be considered as engaged, whereas as intellectuals who actually joined the March in Birmingham and were beaten and jailed with everyone else might be regarded as no longer just intellectually engaged, but practicing a form of embrigadement. However, what happens if we recognize the March on Washington as a form of protest-as-ritual event? Are intellectuals who critically sustained, supported and sought to frame it as emancipatory actually practicing intellectual engagement? And are those who even participated in the March itself actually involved in a form of embrigadement?
As such, for our purposes, embrigadement speaks to the moment when calling the sovereign legitimacy of established power into question makes the transition from the force of critique as action (intellectual engagement) to the force of action as critique (embrigadement).
What are we then to make of Jeanson’s intellectual engagement through unyielding insurgent philosophical critique of a western imperialist continuum as disclosed throughout the Algerian Revolutionary War against the occupying colonial power of the French nation-state? Frantz Fanon and Jean-Paul Sartre have each earned their place in the pantheon of the radical imagination due to their emancipatory commitment against Empire as exemplified in, but not limited to, Sartre's Critique of Dialectical Reason Vol.1[7] and Fanon’s classic tome of decolonial phenomenology The Wretched of the Earth,[8] to which Sartre also wrote the notoriously blistering Preface.
And yet what of Jeanson? Why is his Notre Guerre[9] (Our War) not even mentioned in dialogue with Fanon and Sartre? Have we forgotten that it was Jeanson who not only wrote the original Preface to Fanon’s other classic of existential thought and Black liberation discourse, but gave it the title of Black Skin, White Masks by which we remember it today? And more to the point, what are we to make of the fact that the Preface written by Jeanson has never been officially translated to accompany any of the various English language editions of Black Skin, White Masks that exist? Instead, in the current English edition of Black Skin, White Masks, we are left to stomach the neoliberal cosmopolitan platitudes of Kwame Anthony Appiah who, after expending a moderate amount of epistemic effort towards decentering the insurgent orientation of Fanon’s thought towards a more harmonious positionality within the normative gaze of established power, smugly contends that “we are no longer completely convinced by his theories”.[10]
In Marie-Pierre Ulloa’s outstanding biography,[11] she recounts how Jeanson hailed from a fractured bourgeois upbringing in Bordeux and lived a relatively uneventful life during the Nazi German occupation of France, even earning his Diplome D’etudes Superiores in 1943. However, everything changed for Jeanson upon his decision to join the French Resistance when he faced the possibility of forced labor conscription. After choosing to join the Free French forces in Africa, Jeanson had to cross the Pyrenees, where he was then captured and endured five months of internment at a one of Franco's fascist detention camps in Spain until he was finally released with the assistance of institutional pressure from the French Red Cross. Jeanson eventually reached African soil by boat crossing from Malaga to Casablanca, Morocco through Gibraltar, only to then be caught up in the political rivalry between General DeGaulle and General Giraud over the military stewardship of the French armed forces and hence the future political direction of post Second World War France.
After the war, Jeason decided to take the philosophy agregation exam and begin teaching, but was ultimately barred from taking the exam due to a developing tubercular condition he acquired during his stay in the fascist internment camps. Jeanson instead began writing philosophical essays as a journalist for La Gazette de Lausanne as well as for La France Interieure and soon found himself thriving “on the margins of academia”[12] during that now mythic intellectual era of postwar France. At some point during those postwar years, Jeanson eventually made the acquaintance of Gilbert Maire, director of the Thought and Civilization Collection at the now defunct Editions du Myrte who would go on to publish Jeanson’s first book Sartre and the Problem of Morality.[13]
By drawing from Ulloa’s account,[14] we can attempt to paint the following narrative. Jeanson had a friend whose landlady hosted a literary salon to which the promising writer, philosopher and radical autonomous intellectual was invited to attend. At some point during the proceedings, Jeanson was asked to comment upon the evenings lecture delivered by Maire on the thought of Henri Bergson.[15] Although he certainly conveyed a sense of necessary appreciation and even slight praise for the comprehensive take on Bergsonian thought that Maire showcased, Jeanson, never one to suffer fools, intensely refuted what he regarded as Maire’s disingenuous and superficial reading of Sartrean existential philosophy. Jeanson’s severe tone and sharp rebuttal during this intellectual exchange discloses an epistemic irreverence and undaunted hesitation to engage in intellectual polemics that would become a hallmark of the discursive trajectory of Jeanson’s insurgent philosophical thought.
However, much to his credit, Maire actively listened and paid great attention to the serious criticisms Jeanson formulated in defense of Sartrean thought. Afterwards, Maire, being rather gracious and certainly intending to test the literary mettle of the younger Jeanson, immediately suggested that since Jeanson was such an able defender of Sartre, perhaps he would be interested in writing a book dedicated to Sartrean apologetics, assuring Jeanson that Editions du Myrte would itself publish it. Taking Maire at his word, Jeanson rose to the occasion and within five months went on to write a daring philosophical work of Sartrean ethics entitled Le problem moral et la pensée de Sartre, or as we know it in Robert V. Stone’s authoritative English translation – Sartre and the Problem of Morality. What’s striking is that Jeanson ultimately outpaced the discursive trajectory of Sartre’s own intellectual endeavors at very the same time Sartre was engaged in fleshing out the ethical implications of his existential orientation as succinctly announced at the end of Being and Nothingness: “All these questions, which refer us to a pure and not an accessory reflection, can find their reply only on the ethical plane. We shall devote to them a future work.”[16]
As such, with Sartre and the Problem of Morality, Jeanson not only outdid himself in elucidating the ethical implications of Sartrean existential thought, but discursively surpassed Sartre himself. For as Sartre discloses in his letter-forward – “you have so perfectly followed the development of my thought that you have come to pass beyond the position I had taken in my books at the moment I was passing beyond it myself and to raise with regard to the relations between morality and history, the universal and the concrete transcendence, the very questions I was asking myself at that same time.”[17] Again, the sheer audacity of Jeanson writing a definitive work of Sartrean ethics that preempted Sartre’s own philosophical endeavors while Sartre himself was engaged in working out his own thoughts on ethics, should not be overlooked or underestimated.[18]
Indeed, Jeanson was uniquely prepared to write such a work, for as Ulloa’s research reminds us, “From January to September 1947, Jeanson, who was becoming increasingly familiar with the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty and Sartre, wrote eleven articles for La France Interieure. His first column inaugurated a series on the theme: ‘The Scourge of Our Times: Absurdism,’ in which he attacked the men of his era who engaged in ‘a sort of immolation of [their] imperatives’ and who systematized absurdity by settling into absurdism. Jeanson maintained that absurdism stood apart from most literature being produced at the time and was authoritatively illustrated by Albert Camus in his Myth of Sisyphus. That book, according to him, constituted a ‘codification of absurdism.’ He rose up against the idea of assimilating Camus’ thought to Sartre’s philosophy.”[19]
Jeanson’s position sheds some much needed light upon the question of why in 1952, Sartre chose Jeanson, of all people, to write a review of The Rebel[20] by Albert Camus for Les Temps Modernes. No doubt, Sartre knew Jeanson had already made a sharp distinction in his earlier work between a philosophy of the Absurd and a philosophy of existence. “From now on, none of us can dispense with choosing between a negation of all philosophy, whereby human life is definitively doomed to have no meaning, and a philosophy of meaning imposed by man on his actual situation; between a form of cynicism, where being is what it is in its essence, with no possible recourse, and the courageous lucidity that considers existence an indefinite possibility for beginning again and freely fashioning oneself.”[21]
This distinction which had only been implied, was now be rendered explicit through Jeanson’s existential liberationist critique. For with The Rebel, Camus boldly revealed a reactionary impetus that undergirded his philosophy of the Absurd, thus allowing Jeanson to critically galvanize a philosophy of existence towards sustaining the conditions of possibility for revolution in history. For as Jeanson discloses, “Viewed from on high, the agitation of humans on this earth can appear quite vain. But if you wish to know what their existence may be like, you will have to pick up the thread of your own life and go down again to live among men. There each one gives a meaning to his life and you cannot abandon your own and decide that the meaning of all life is only an illusion. … this is certainly not the case for the simple existence of men who, for example, may be hungry and who … might undertake to struggle against those responsible for their hunger.”[22]
As such, just who is this Francis Jeanson for whom the existential liberationist burden of “How to maintain the ambiguity between individual authenticity and revolutionary liberation was … as much a practical as it was a theoretical problem”?[23] And what does it mean when the work and lived experience of a man, a writer and existential philosopher, whose very name should ignite the radical imagination and set fire to liberal inhibitions against intellectual engagement and embrigadement that proliferate within the imperial mainstream, languishes in the coerced obscurity and calculated disregard of the normative gaze? Such indeed are the perils of history, are they not? To the victorious advance of neoliberal capitalist global hegemony, go the epistemic spoils of historical memory.
Indeed, Jeanson’s decisive transition from intellectual engagement to embrigagement occured roughly around 1957, a time when the Algerian Revolutionary War against the occupying colonial power of the French nation-state had reached a fever pitch with no signs of abating. However, for France to now impose upon the people of Algeria what Nazi Germany had just imposed upon France became unconscionable to Sartre as an engaged intellectual. While for Fanon who actually joined the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN), and Jeanson who initiated the Jeanson Network, intellectual engagement, even of the Sartrean variety, was no longer enough. For both Fanon[24] and Jeanson, a more militant involvement was necessary, the times thus called for embrigadement.
The Jeanson Network, otherwise known in infamy as le portiers de valises, began to transport funds from Algerian workers and Leftist sympathizers in France to the National Liberation Front (FLN) in Algeria. The radical backbone of this insurgent network of clandestine militants was forged by around several dozen artists, activists, workers, academics and intellectuals whose lived experience of resistance under the Nazi Occupation of France during World War II singularly prepared them to resist the structural negation of the shared humanity of Algerians now suffering the same fate of coloniality[25] at the hands of France itself.
And for this, for Jeanson’s solidarity with the universality of the human condition violently coerced underground through coloniality in the Raw,[26] he has been disregarded by the normative gaze, soundly condemned to the margins of history, even as the pristine banners of Camus’ Absurd fealty to a liberal humanism[27] that has no gravity outside of the imperial mainstream of Europe remains perched high amongst the Ideals of modernity at the brutal expense of the wretched of the earth. By 1960 the Jeanson Network disbanded as Jeanson himself went underground and was convicted in absentia to ten years imprisonment for high treason. By this time, after years of having been radically outflanked by the Catholic Left on the question of Algeria,[28] Sartre’s support for Jeanson was as unwavering as his solidarity with the ascendant humanity of the so-called Third World. Les Temps Modernes even published a letter from Jeanson during his underground exile. Here it is appropriate to recall Jeanson at length in his own words.
...But let’s turn to our choice: is it the right one? Yes, I think so, simply because there is no other.”
Since the number one French problem was the Algerian problem it was necessary to recall the Left to the only road that can be theirs in such a matter: solidarity with a people in struggle for its freedom. Since the Left had lost its sense of action, it was necessary to act in order to give this back to it, and thus act in the sense of that solidarity. Since the Left couldn’t manage to unite it was necessary that each of our undertakings be, in itself, an example of unity in action. And since solidarity doesn’t accommodate itself to solipsism, and since its truth demands that it be recognized by those with whom we claim to be in solidarity, it was necessary that our Algerian comrades not confuse us with all the loudmouths and advice-givers that the Left had so generously graced them with since November 1, 1954.
This is to say that we had no choice. These last three years the reawakening of the Left and the maintaining of the possibilities of a Franco-Algerian friendship passed through a certain type of action demanding, in any case, that this type of action manifest itself both here and there. Within these limits, the concrete specifications were up to the client who gave us their assistance on this or that level. And I depended on the chiefs of networks for those who had chosen to totally commit themselves to us.
But it must be seen that everything is of a piece. I began my clandestine action by driving Algerian leaders across Paris. Six months later I found myself responsible for the centralization and evacuation of funds collected in France by the FLN. A few days ago a foreign correspondent asked me during a press conference if we also transported arms for the FLN, and if we had participated in violent actions. I answered that we hadn’t, and that this wasn’t for a principled reason, but simply because the Algerians had judged it preferable to not impose upon us a drama of conscience that they were perfectly capable of imagining. I could have said, but a new question had diverted me, that in fact, taking refuge behind a principle was trivial: in such a case if you assist revolutionaries you assist their revolution.
I know that we are accused of treason. But I ask, who and what do we betray? Judicially we are plunged in a civil war, since the Algerians are considered full French citizens; we thus don’t betray France. In fact, the national community no longer exists; where are its great axes, where are its lines of force, where are the fixed points of its structure? No nationalist mysticism, no neo-Barresianism will ever persuade me to confess to a sense of community with MM Debré and Kovacs, with General Massu and Lt Charbonnier, with the agents of repression and those who work to justify it. No formal sense of civic duty will make me admit that there still exist ‘legal forms of conduct and common obligations’ when the president of the republic himself – the Savior of France — makes himself the champion of illegality by taking power thanks to a coup de force and in not applying the constitution that he himself had voted for under these very conditions. Every day the domain of the arbitrary grows. Yesterdays’ legality is ceaselessly revised; a simple decree allows a state of emergency to be declared that parliament — with all its benevolence, and the very moment it voted pleins pouvoirs — hadn’t granted.[29]
In other words, what we are dealing with here, in dialogue with not just Sartre and Fanon, but Marcuse,[30] Benjamin,[31] Buck-Morss[32] and Agamben,[33] is the question of the precipice of anomie.[34] By which we mean a socio-ontological crossroads of lived positionality to established power where power itself exists in an ethical and legal indeterminacy. The sovereign legitimacy of western imperialist power is constituted within the precipice of anomie as it structures existing hierarchal relations by way of the normative gaze that distinguishes by objective violence and miseducation of soul between an imperial mainstream (those who merit human consideration, ethical regard and legal redress) and the underground of modernity (those who do not merit human consideration, ethical regard or legal redress).
The imperial mainstream only experiences the precipice of anomie when established power makes declarations of a ‘State of Emergency’ during which civil rights are officially suspended towards preserving the stability of established power as the condition of possibility for civil society. However, it is important to keep in mind that the stability of civil society is experienced as an unrelenting socio-ontological gravity of structural-inert violence by the underground of modernity, for whom, the precipice of anomie constitutes an ongoing and undeclared ‘State of Emergency’ that distinguishes imperial mainstream from the underground of modernity in the name of law and order. The accumulative slaughter of innocent Black people by state sanctioned murder as standard police procedure speaks to the Real of the function of ‘race’ as to where the biopolitical boundary of the precipice of anomie begins and where it ends. As such, for the underground of modernity, even the form of civil rights collapses under socio-historical pressure as a pretense that enables the fact of civil rights to be negated as something that is perpetually called into question by the normative gaze whenever it is deemed biopolitically convenient by established power.
Jeanson continues on, explaining that -
“Of course, this isn’t fascism. But if we betray something at this moment, is it anything but a subversive enterprise carried out against an unstable regime by fascist forces that had installed it as transitional two years ago? And now, what? There is no longer one family in Algeria that hasn’t had a member of its family join the maquis or been tortured or killed by the French. Hundreds of thousands of men, women and children of that country eat the grass on the Tunisian and Moroccan borders. 15%-20% of the Algerian population, nearly two million inhabitants of this ‘French province’ are concentrated in camps where an average of one child a day among a “regroupement” of 1000 people dies every day, which comes to about 1500 children a day in total. Must we console ourselves by noting that in these camps there are neither gas chambers nor crematory ovens? And should we feel any scruples about rising up alongside the Algerians against those who inflict this on them, or who content themselves with deploring the fact that others inflict it on them? When things have reached such a point there is no longer room for a third camp; one is either with one side, or with the other.”[35]
Now, let us back track a bit and return to that fateful year of 1952, the year which saw Jeanson pen such a devastating critique[36] of The Rebel by Camus. That year, 1952, was the same year that Jeanson also wrote the Preface to a book that was written by a little known radical existentialist thinker of decolonial phenomenology named Frantz Fanon. That book, which was mainly comprised of Fanon’s doctoral thesis which was soundly rejected by the French Academy, entitled "Essai sur la desalienation du Noir"(Essay on the disalienation of the Black) is now known by the title suggested to Fanon by Jeanson himself - Black Skin, White Masks and was subsequently published by Editions du Seuil that same year.
As such, this brings us to the question of embarking on the task of an initial engagement with Jeanson’s Preface to Black Skin, White Masks. And what we first find in this long suppressed Preface, is Jeanson in dialogue with Fanon as a means of preparing French readers for an existential liberationist critique that has “not ceased to be posed by lived Black experience in the raw”[37] to this day.
For in order to do justice to the radical edge of Fanon’s epistemic ruptures in Black Skin, White Masks that disclose a nascent decolonial phenomenology which history will eventually show culminates with The Wretched of the Earth, Jeanson decidedly focuses on the exceptional antagonism revealed by the assertion of Black subjectivity-as-human ‘being’ within the context of a western imperialist continuum. “Let us dare to say it, finally: in speaking like this, Fanon presents a demand which is not ‘presentable’, a demand that makes an appearance in the world without taking the time to get dressed or put makeup on its face. A demand, naked, raw, which refuses to play the game”[38] of the normative gaze of western imperialist power, no matter how it happens to be reconfigured.
Indeed, according to Jeanson, Fanon reveals the exceptional antagonism of Black liberation as “A scandal. Not ‘presentable’, unseeming, maladjusted, nearly inexpressible, non-objectifiable, such is the sovereign assertion that traverses with an ample and constant quiver the pages that we will read.”[39] And in his own movement of emancipatory praxis from intellectual engagement towards embrigadement, does not Jeanson disclose, a rare, and dare we say, exemplary commitment of solidarity to this universality of the human condition that the exceptional antagonism revealed by the assertion of Black subjectivity-as-human ‘being’ against western imperialist power makes accessible to us all? And is this “scandal” not the very source of the disregard that Jeanson’s life and thought evokes within the normative gaze?
*this is a revised and expanded version of a paper entitled “From Engagement to Embrigadement: Introductory Remarks on the Insurgent Philosophical Implications of Francis Jeanson” presented during the 28th Conference of the North American Sartre Society at the University of North Carolina-Wilmington on November 4th, 2023.
[1] The most thorough coverage of this intellectual melee which also includes both comprehensive summaries and primary sources is Sartre and Camus: A Historic Confrontation, edited and translated by David A. Sprintzen and Adrian Van Den Hoven, (Amherst, New York: Humanity Books, 2004).
[2] Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, (New York: Grove Press, 1952, 1967). Jeanson’s Introduction is included in French edition of Fanon’s collected works. Frantz Fanon, Oeuvres, (Paris: Editions La Decouverte, 2011).
[3] The normative gaze refers to unarticulated structures of meaning imposed by established power that provide an unreflective background framework which situates consciousness in the world through coercion and deception. see A. Shahid Stover, Being and Insurrection, (New York: Cannae Press, 2019) pp.21-27.
[4] David L. Schalk, The Spectrum of Political Engagement, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979) and War and the Ivory Tower: Algerian and Vietnam, (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1991).
[5] Schalk, The Spectrum of Political Engagement, p.23.
[6] Stover, Being and Insurrection, pp.113-115.
[7] Jean-Paul Sartre, Critique of Dialectical Reason Vol.1 (London: Verso, 1960, 2004).
[8] Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, (New York: Grove Press, 1961).
[9] Francis Jeanson, Notre Guerre, (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1960).
[10] Kwame Anthony Appiah, Foreword to the 2008 edition of Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, p.ix.
[11] Marie-Pierre Ulloa, Francis Jeanson: A Dissident Intellectual from the French Resistance to the Algerian War, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2007). The only drawback to Ulloa’s otherwise erudite work is that it is exhaustive in dealing with everything except the relation between Jeanson and Fanon to which she devotes a measly, though certainly accurate and measured, 2 pages. She does not delve at all in their socially tense yet personally productive acquaintance with each other, nor does she attempt to even briefly summarize the content of Jeanson’s Introduction and eventual Postface to Fanon’s Black Skin, White Masks. Ulloa also makes no mention that Jeanson himself gave the book that title, nor does she try to inform us as to the extent to which Jeanson was instrumental in getting Fanon’s work published through his contacts with the Catholic Left at Editions de Seuil.
[12] Ulloa, p.55.
[13] Francis Jeanson, Sartre and the Problem of Morality, transl. by Robert V. Stone (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1947, 1965, 1980).
[14] Ulloa, pp.57-58.
[15] Henri Bergson, Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness, (New York: Dover Publications, 1889, 2001).
[16] Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, (New York: Washington Square Press, 1943, 1992) p.798.
[17] Jean-Paul Sartre, “Letter-Forward” to Francis Jeanson, Sartre and the Problem of Morality, p.xxxix.
[18] Robert V. Stone is the only radical thinker I’ve read who even attempts to grapple with the philosophical implications of Jeanson’s preemptive ethical strike in his invaluable Introduction to Sartre and the Problem of Morality which Stone himself also translated into English in 1980.
[19] Marie-Pierre Ulloa, Francis Jeanson: A Dissident Intellectual from the French Resistance to the Algerian War, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2007) p.56.
[20] Albert Camus, The Rebel, (New York: Vintage International Edition, 1951, 1991).
[21] Quoted in Ulloa, pp.56-57.
[22] Francis Jeanson, “Albert Camus, or the Soul in Revolt”, included in Sartre and Camus: A Historic Confrontation, pp.83, 87.
[23] Robert V. Stone, “Translator’s Introduction”, Sartre and the Problem of Morality, p.xviii.
[24] Check out Irene L. Gendzier, Frantz Fanon: A Critical Study, (New York: Grove Press, 1973), Alice Cherki, Frantz Fanon: A Portrait, (Ithica, New York: Cornell University Press, 2000, 2006) and David Macey, Frantz Fanon: A Biography, (London: Verso, 2000, 2012).
[25] “Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism and Latin America”, Nepantla: Views from the South 1.3, included in Coloniality At Large, edited by Mabel Morana, Enrique Dussel, and Carlos A. Jauregui, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), see also The Brotherwise Dispatch Vol.2, #17, Sept-Nov/2015.
[26] Stover, Being and Insurrection, p.36.
[27] Albert Camus, “The Crisis of Man”, Lecture delivered in New York at Columbia University, March 28, 1946.
[28] Schalk, War and the Ivory Tower, p.101.
[29] Letter From Francis Jeanson to Jean-Paul Sartre, Les Temps Modernes, April-May 1960. Translated my Mitch Abidor for Marxists.org.
[30] Herbert Marcuse, “The Problem of Violence and the Radical Opposition”, Five Lectures, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970).
[31] Walter Benjamin, “Critique of Violence”, Selected Writings Vol.1 1913-1926, (Cambridge: Belknap/Harvard University Press, 1996, 2004).
[32] Susan Buck-Morss, Dreamworld and Catastrophe, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000).
[33] Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003).
[34] Stover, Being and Insurrection, pp.54-55.
[35] Letter From Francis Jeanson to Jean-Paul Sartre, Les Temps Modernes, April-May 1960. Translated my Mitch Abidor for Marxists.org.
[36] Francis Jeanson, “Albert Camus, or The Soul in Revolt”, (Amherst, New York: Humanity Books, 1952, 2004) p.79.
[37] Translation mine own based upon the upcoming complete translation of Francis Jeanson’s “Preface” to Black Skin, White Masks by Devin Zane Shaw as commissioned by The Brotherwise Dispatch to be published in Sartre Studies International.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Ibid.
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